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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the long run performance of IPOs on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM). 
The results show that the three year equally weighted cumulative adjusted returns average -16.5%. 
The magnitude of this underperformance is consistent with most reported studies in different 
developed and emerging markets. Based on multivariate regression models, firms with small issues 
and higher ex-ante financial strength seem on average to experience greater long run 
underperformance, supporting the divergence of opinion and overreaction hypothesis. On the other 
hand, Mauritian firms do not on average time their offerings to lower cost of capital and as such, 
there seems to be limited support for the windows of opportunity hypothesis.  
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1. Introduction 
According to Lee (2003, p.1), “from the researcher’s point of view, IPOs are important as they 
represent an opportunity to observe strategic choices related to valuation and disclosure.” Indeed, 
there has been an enormous amount of research produced on IPOs, which has revealed that the 
pricing and performance of IPOs is characterised by several apparent anomalies.1 One of most 
important of these anomalies relates to their long-run performance. In particular, IPOs often generate 
poor performance during their first few years of trading despite having risen significantly in price 
during initial trading.  
 
Early studies2 on the long-run performance of IPOs were conducted in the US markets, with 
researchers thereafter undertaking comparative work on other stock exchanges to test this anomaly. 
With some exceptions, the results are mostly in support of the claim that the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs is a world-wide phenomenon.3 However, the degree of long-run 
underperformance varies considerably across markets. Based on the overreaction hypothesis, it is 
often argued that the initial underpricing of IPOs is affected positively by ex ante uncertainty, and 
that a greater degree of underpricing will be followed by worse long-run aftermarket performance. 
Initially, buyers are very optimistic about the purchase of IPOs, which drives up their prices. 
However, when more and more information becomes available at a later stage, the IPOs will 
approach their fair values. As such, it may happen that the short run underpricing of equities is 
accompanied by long run under performance. Our research sheds additional light on this topic by 
empirically assessing the long run performance of Mauritian IPOs underperformance and whether 
the long-run is related to short run underpricing. We therefore contribute to the rising body of 
international evidence on this issue. 
 
The Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM), with its specific institutional features and lack of investor 
sophistication, has been the subject of virtually no existing research and constitutes a unique 
environment in which to conduct research. The SEM is truly a unique market as the IPO mechanisms 
in place differ compared with those in practice in other developed and developing markets. In 
particular, the role of the underwriter is limited as there are no investment banks in Mauritius and 
new issues are sponsored and marketed by stockbroking companies. In addition, the listing rules do 
not require as much information compared with that needed in developed or indeed many other 
                                                 
1
 See Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988, 1994) and Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) for summaries of IPO 
anomalies.  
2
 Ritter (1991), Loughran el al. (1994) amongst others. 
3
 Loughran el al. (1994). 
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developing markets. Studies on other markets have emphasised the key role that the underwriter has 
in the process, and therefore the present study represents a unique opportunity to evaluate the impact 
of its absence. 
 
Very little research has been done with regards to IPOs in the African markets more generally, in 
part because of their newness and the lack of readily available long histories of data. To our 
knowledge, there are only four existing studies that have considered the Mauritian IPO market. 
Gasbarro et al. (2003) and Bundoo (2007) focus on the aftermarket performance and underpricing of 
IPOs, represent the first attempts at formal analysis. However, both studies are subject to some 
caveats. First, the sample periods of those studies are limited. In fact, the first study only contains 
firms which are listed from 1989 until 1996, while the second study takes into account firms listed 
until 2004. Also, for both studies, some firms are not included in the sample. Second, the studies 
consider a more limited range of hypotheses than we consider here. Third, the studies do not examine 
the issuing activity of seasoned equity offerings on the SEM. In more recent research, Subadar-
Agathee et al. (2013a) examine specifically whether there are hot and cold issue markets in Mauritius 
while Subadar-Agathee et al. (2013b) focus on the short-run performance of newly listed companies. 
The present paper aims to fill a research gap in the literature by examining in detail the long-run 
performance of Mauritian IPOs for up to three years after offer and the factors affecting that 
performance, taking into account all firms listed on the SEM from 1989 until 2010. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the key literature on 
the long run performance of initial public offerings. Section 3 briefly describes the Stock Exchange 
of Mauritius. Section 4 outlines the methodology used, while the results are presented and analysed 
in Section 5, with Section 6 providing concluding remarks.  
 
2. Prior Research 
The prevalence of the long underperformance of IPOs is observed in many markets around the 
world. For instance, Carter el al. (1998) claim a long run average return of -19.92% based on 2292 
US IPOs, while Gregory et al. (2010) report a long run abnormal return of -16.4% for UK IPOs for 
the period 1975-04. Similarly, Álvarez and González (2005), studying the Spanish market during 
1987-1997, report underperformance of 14.16% while Omran (2005), using the IPOs on the Egyptian 
Market from 1994-98, documents a long-run underperformance of 27%. Moreover, Aggarwal et al. 
(1993) find that IPOs underperform in the long run by 47% and 24% in Brazil and Chile 
respectively. However, it seems that there are notable exceptions from some markets where long-run 
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abnormal performance can be observed. For instance, Kim et al. (1995), Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell 
and Goodacre (2007) and Chi and Padgett (2002) find that IPO companies outperformed the market 
by 91.6 %, 32.63% and 10.26 % in Korea, Malaysia and Sweden respectively. However, in general, 
an average long run underperformance of IPOs prevails in most markets.  
 
A number of theoretical explanations and models have been proposed to underpin this empirically 
observed long run underperformance. The popular justifications for this observed phenomenon rest 
upon the overreaction hypothesis,4 where it is argued that the initial returns of IPOs are affected 
positively by ex ante uncertainty, and that higher initial returns will be followed by worse long-run 
aftermarket performance. Initially, buyers are very optimistic about the purchase of IPOs, which 
drives up their prices. However, when more information becomes available at a later stage, these 
IPOs will approach their fair values. As such, it may happen that the short run initial returns of 
equities are accompanied by long run underperformance.  
 
There is also the divergence of opinion hypothesis suggested by Miller (1977, 2000), where long-run 
performance is related to the divergence of opinions such that prices will adjust downwards in the 
long run as information flows increase with time and divergence of opinions decreases. However, the 
divergence of opinion will be greater when the ex-ante uncertainty regarding the IPO is higher. As 
such, the hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and aftermarket 
performance. Other studies5 have also justified long run underperformance of IPOs by arguing that 
managers take advantage of investors’ optimism. Ritter (1991, p.4) claims that “If high volume 
periods are associated with poor long-run performance, this would indicate that issuers are 
successfully timing new issues to take advantage of windows of opportunity”. In fact, Loughran et al. 
(1994) suggest that if companies are successfully timing their offerings for periods when the cost of 
equity capital is relatively low, this should manifest itself in low returns subsequently being earned 
by investors.  
 
Underperformance of IPOs could also arise because there is a tendency for firms to try to appear 
attractive before going public. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) argue that firms will undertake an 
aggressive earnings management exercise to increase investors’ optimism in the IPO year. As such, 
IPOs will window dress their accounting numbers such that investors are overly optimistic about 
                                                 
4
 Miller (1977); De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). 
5Loughran and Ritter (1995), Rajan and Servaes (1997), and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998). 
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their stocks. To this effect, Jain and Kini (1994, p. 1700) claim that it will result in “pre-IPO 
performance being overstated and post-IPO performance being understated”.  
 
Finally, Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) consider the reputation of investment banks in explaining the 
underperformance of some IPOs. They observe that long run underperformance is more pronounced 
for firms that are associated with less prestigious investment banks. Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1999) claim that investors consider an investment bank’s past performance as a signal of the firm’s 
quality. In particular, the credibility of investment banks will be high if they have marketed previous 
IPOs with better long-term performance.  In other words, being associated with good offerings will 
have a positive effect on the investment bank’s reputation and investment banks are likely to secure 
this advantage to increase their future market shares. Therefore, high-prestige investment bankers 
will protect their reputations by underwriting IPOs that will be likely to experience the least negative 
long-run returns. In this respect, a positive relationship between underwriter prestige and long-run 
performance is expected. Michaely and Shaw (1994), Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and Booth 
(2004) confirm this positive relationship, although they use different proxies for underwriter prestige. 
 
3. An Overview of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) 
The Stock Exchange of Mauritius Ltd (SEM) was set up on 5th July 1989 based on the Stock 
Exchange Act of 1988. At that time, the Stock Exchange Commission (SEC) was the regulatory 
body of the SEM. The structure of the SEM comprises two markets, the official and the over the 
counter market, now known as the Development and Enterprise Market (DEM). Companies listed on 
the official market have larger capitalisations and are subject to more stringent regulatory standards 
than companies on the DEM. The main market index of the SEM is the SEMDEX,6 which reflects 
the price movements of all companies listed on the official market. The official market has 
categorized the companies listed into seven sectors: Banks and Insurance, Industry, Investments, 
Sugar, Commerce, Leisure & Hotels, and Transport.   
 
Since the inception of the SEM, there have been several major developments. These include the 
setting up of a centralized clearing and settlement system in 1997, the setting up of a new regulatory 
body known as the Financial Services Commission in 2001, the implementation of the Stock 
Exchange of Mauritius Automated Trading System (SEMATS), replacing the open-outcry single 
                                                 
6
 The SEMDEX is an all shares index.  It reflects capitalisation based on each listed stock which is weighted according to 
its shares in the overall market.  The current value of the SEMDEX is expressed in relation to a base period, 5 July 1989, 
with a value of 100. 
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auction method and the replacement of the old Stock Exchange Act 1988 by the Securities Act 2005, 
amongst others. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1 Sample and Data Collection Methods 
The data used in this study consist of all firms which have gone public on the official market of the 
Stock Exchange of Mauritius for the period 1989 until 2010.7 Based on this criterion, the sample 
perfectly represents the population, consisting of 44 listed companies.8 Given the limited number of 
firms, we have included firms which delisted during the sample period.9 The prospectuses as well as 
the annual reports were used to collect data prior to listing. In addition, daily price histories were 
obtained for each sample firm for the period 1989 to 2010. The sample of firms is fairly small 
relative to studies on developed markets. However, Gasbarro et al. (2003) argue that the sample size 
is also relatively small in other emerging market IPO studies. For instance, other studies such as 
Omran (2005), Lyn and Zychowicz (2002), Hameed and Lim (1998)  and Dawson (1987) have 
considered 29, 52, 33, 52 and 21 new issues on the Brazilian, Egyptina, Hungarian, Singaporean and 
Malaysian markets respectively.  
 
4.2 Long Run Return Measurement 
A number of studies10 have commented on the different approaches to measure long run 
performance. Lyon et al. (1999) claimed that the choices of the size of the long-run performance as 
well as the power of statistical tests are subject to considerable variation due to the methodological 
differences. Two different approaches are used in this study to analyze the long run abnormal 
performance: the event-time approach and the calendar time-approach. According to some 
researchers,11 the event time approach like the buy and hold returns seems to be more representative 
of investor experience. However, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) claim that the event-
time approach suffers from cross-sectional correlation due to common shocks in the returns of IPOs 
such that the statistical significance of mean abnormal returns may be overstated.  To mitigate the 
potential problems of cross-sectional correlations among individual firms in the event-time approach 
                                                 
7
 Similar to the sample definition of Gasbarro et al. (2003). 
8
 Our sample effectively ends in 2005 since there were no Mauritian initial public offers of ordinary equities on the SEM 
from 2005 until 2010.   
9
 There are seven firms which delisted during the sample period; the SEM codes for these firms are CIT, COURTS, 
DELPHIS, GBH, LIT, MDA(O) and MOUNT. 
10
 Lyon et al. (1999), Fama (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) amongst others. 
11
 Kothari and Warner (1996), Lyon et al. (1999). 
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and to yield more robust t-statistics, many studies12 have recommended and applied the calendar time 
methodology.  However, according to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the shortcoming of this approach 
is that has low power to detect abnormal performance as it averages over months of ‘‘hot’’ and 
‘‘cold’’ event activity. As such,  Gao and Jain (2011, p.1673) argue that “since both the event time 
and calendar time methodologies have their pros and cons, the general approach in long run 
performance studies is to utilise both methods in order to demonstrate robustness of the results”. 
 
The Event-time Approach 
Based on a number of studies,13 three measures are used to evaluate the long run performance of 
IPOs. These are the Cumulative average adjusted returns (CAR), the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) and Wealth relative.  
 
Cumulative average adjusted returns (CAR) 
Based on Ritter (1991), the returns are computed for two intervals; the initial period return (month 0) 
and the aftermarket period returns (months 1 to 36). Following Allen et al. (1999), the raw return for 
each firm, 0iR  , for the month 0 is calculated as:               
    1/ 010 −= iii PPR             (1) 
where 1iP  is closing price of IPO on the last trading day of the first trading month and 0iP  is closing 
price of IPO i on the first trading day. Similarly, for the market return, Rmt, the return is calculated 
from the differences in the market index, i.e., the SEMDEX, for each IPO for the time interval as 
above. For months 1 to 36, the differences in monthly share prices (adjusted for stock splits, bonus 
issues and right issues) for each IPO are observed. The market adjusted returns are then calculated 
as:                 
mtitit RRAR −=                 (2) 
where itR  is monthly raw return for IPO i in month t; mtR  is monthly market return in month t. 
 
The average benchmark-adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t is the equally-
weighted arithmetic average of the benchmark-adjusted returns and is calculated as:        
∑
=
=
n
i
itt AR
n
AR
1
1
              (3) 
                                                 
12
 Fama (1998); Gompers and Lerner (2003); Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007); Gao and Jain (2011) amongst others. 
13
 Ritter (1991); Gompers and Lerner (2003); Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2010); Bangassa and Chen (2011) 
amongst others. 
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The cumulative benchmark-adjusted return for the aftermarket performance from event month 1 to 
event month t is the summation of the average benchmark-adjusted returns.  In particular, the 
cumulative average benchmark-adjusted return is calculated by adding the average benchmark 
adjusted returns ( tAR ) over various intervals during the 36-month aftermarket period.  As such, the 
Cumulative market adjusted returns (CAR1,t) from month 1 to month t are given by  
∑
=
=
t
i
tt ARCAR
1
,1                 (4) 
The t-statistics for the tAR  series are calculated as 
ttt sdnARARt /*)( =              (5) 
where nt is the number of firms trading in event month t and sdt is the cross-sectional standard 
deviation for event month t.  
 
Following Ritter (1991), the statistical significance14 of the CARs is calculated as 
cov*)1(*2var*/*)( 1 −+= ttnCARCARt ttit         (6) 
where var is the average cross-sectional variance over 36 months and cov is the first-order 
autocovariance of the tAR  series, which is the product of the correlation coefficient and the cross-
sectional variance. This conventional t-statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
abnormal return is equal to zero for a sample of n firms. 
 
Moreover, according to Fama (1998), the use of equally or value-weighted returns is dependent upon 
the hypothesis of interest to the researcher. In effect, Lyon et al. (1999) recommend equally 
weighting returns if significant misvaluations are greater among small firms than among big firms 
while Brav et al. (2000) argue that a value-weighted scheme should be used if the aim of researchers 
is to compute the average wealth change of investors following an event. As such, in addition to 
equally weighted returns, the value-weighted market-adjusted returns ARt, shown in equation (7), are 
also calculated for firm i, where wi is the value weight. The value weights are calculated as the 
market capitalisations of firm i at offer price immediately after the listing, divided by the total market 
capitalisation of the whole IPO sample. Thereafter, as shown in equation (8), the value-weighted 
CARs are the sum of value-weighted market-adjusted returns ARt. 
∑
=
=
n
i
itit ARwAR
1
           (7) 
                                                 
14
 Following Barber and Lyon (1997), the use of cross-sectional standard errors is advocated.  
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∑
=
=
t
i
tt ARCAR
1
,1            (8) 
 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
According to Kooli and Suret (2004), buy-and-hold abnormal returns have an advantage in 
measuring the investor experience. In particular, the long-term investor experience is better captured 
by compounding short-term returns to acquire long-term buy-and-hold returns. As such, as an 
alternative measure to CAR, the buy and hold abnormal return, which is defined as a strategy where 
a stock is purchased at the first closing market price after going public and held until its T 
anniversary, is defined as:15 
1)1(
1
−+∏=
=
it
T
t
iT rR            (9) 
where T is number of months and itr  is the raw return on firm i in event month t, T is 36 months here 
since we consider the 3-year total return. The holding period return on the benchmark during the 
corresponding period for firm i, RmT, is also calculated in the same manner. 
 
Based Kooli and Suret (2004), the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) is therefore defined as:16 
]1)1([]1)1([
11
−+∏−−+∏=
==
mt
T
t
it
T
t
iT rrBHAR                                 (10) 
where mtr  is the return on the benchmark during the corresponding time period.  
The mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns for a period t are defined as: 
∑
=
=
nt
i
ititt BHARxBHAR
1
             (11) 
The weight itx  is 1/nt when abnormal returns are equally-weighted and is ∑ ii MVMV  when 
returns are value-weighted, where iMV
 
is the firm’s stock market value is on its listing date.  
 
Based on the studies of Johnson (1978), Sutton (1993) and Lyon et al. (1999), a bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic is used to test the statistical significance of long-run abnormal returns. 
In particular, Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that the distribution of long-run returns are positively 
skewed such that the conventional t-statistics are negatively biased, leading to inflated significance 
levels.  To eliminate this bias, they use a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic. This is also 
supported by Sutton (1993, p.802) who argues that a bootstrapped t-test “should be preferred to the t-
                                                 
15
 Based on Ritter (1991), the return excludes the initial underpricing period. 
16
 However, for our case and in contrast to Ritter (1991), the returns are market-adjusted rather than control firm 
adjusted. 
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test when the parent distribution is asymmetrical, because it reduces the probability of type I error in 
cases where the t-test has an inflated type I error rate and it is more powerful in other situations.”  
The bootstrapped application of this test statistic, based on the procedure by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999), is: 
)
6
1
3
1( 2 b
b
bb
bb
b
as
n
SSnt γγ )) ++=          (12) 
where 
)( tb
t
b
t
b BHAR
BHARBHARS
σ
−
= , and ∑
=
−
=
nb
i t
b
b
b
t
b
itb
BHARn
BHARBHAR
1
3
3
)(
)(
σ
γ)             (13) 
 
From above, γ)  is an estimate of the coefficient of skewness. The test statistics involve drawing b 
resamples of size bn  from the original sample.
17
 The bootstrapped critical values for the skewness-
adjusted t-statistics are calculated based on the resamples and are compared to the skewness-adjusted 
t-statistic for each of the actual return series to determine whether there is any underperformance (or 
overperformance). 
 
Wealth Relatives 
Several studies18 have considered wealth relatives as the measure of performance. Consistent with 
these studies, a wealth relative is defined as the ratio of the end-of-period wealth from holding a 
portfolio of shares/issuers to the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of matching 
companies or market benchmarks. The wealth relative is computed as: 
BenchmarksonturnHoldandBuyTotalYearThreeAverage
IPOsonturnHoldandBuyTotalYearThreeAverage
WR
.Re1
Re1
+
+
=
        (14) 
A wealth relative greater than one implies that the IPO portfolio outperforms its benchmark while a 
wealth relative of less than one suggests that it is underperforming the matching firms or market 
benchmark. 
 
The Calendar-time Approach 
As stated above, the calendar-time approach is used to control for event clustering and cross-
correlation in IPO returns since returns are aggregated into portfolios. To this effect, the Fama-
French three factor model is used to measure the abnormal return. The model takes into account 
                                                 
17
 Specifically, 1000 bootstrapped resamples are drawn from the original sample of bn =n/4. 
18
 Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Gao and Jain (2011) amongst others. 
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three factors, namely the market risk premium, size premium and value premium: 
tttftmttftpt eHMLBSMBRRRR +++−+=− )()()( 321 ββα
    (15) 
where:  Rpt is the monthly return in calendar month t on a portfolio of IPOs within the past three 
years before calendar month t; Rft is the one-month Mauritian risk free rate observed in calendar 
month t;19 Rmt is the monthly market return of SEMDEX in calendar month t; SMBt is size factor in 
calendar month t, namely, the difference between the equal-weight mean of the returns on a portfolio 
of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks; HMLt
 
is the market-to-book factor in calendar month t, 
namely, the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio stocks and the 
return on a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio stocks. 
 
Due to the small number of IPOs on a yearly basis on the Mauritian market, the construction of the 
traditional six size-BE/ME (book to market equity ratios) portfolios and the six size-performance 
portfolios used by a number of studies is not possible. As such, the methodology we employ partially 
follows Aggarwal et al. (2008) and Bundoo (2006) which allows for the construction of size and 
book to market factors when dealing with small sample sizes. In particular, the sample stocks are 
sorted each year with respect to the end-of period market capitalisation using a 50% breakpoint; from 
the smallest to largest. The median capitalisation size is used to split the stocks into two categories: 
small (S) and big (B). SMB is subsequently calculated as the equally-weight average of the returns on 
the small stock portfolios minus the returns on the big stock portfolios. Correspondingly for each 
year, the listed firms are sorted by book to market ratios into low and high portfolios, using the 
median value as the cutoff point. HML is subsequently constructed in the same manner as SMB and 
is the equally-weighted average of the returns on the high book-to-market stock portfolios minus the 
returns on the low book-to-market stocks portfolios.  
 
4.3 Hypothesis Development and the Long run performance of IPOs 
To measure IPO performance, one-year, two-year and three year buy and hold returns20 are 
examined. To explore factors determining IPO performance, three theories are considered following 
Ritter (1998). These are the divergence of opinion hypothesis, the impresario hypothesis and the 
windows of opportunity hypothesis. 
                                                 
19
 Consistent with other studies (Drew and Veeraraghavan (2002), Chen et al. (2010)), the Mauritian base lending rate is 
used as a proxy due to the absence of data on short-term treasury bills in the early 1990s.  Following Chen et al. (2010), 
the annual risk free interest rate divided by 12 is the monthly risk free rate.    
20
 Buy and hold returns are used since all firms (except for one) survived from the first day of public trading until their 
three year anniversary such that there is no rebalancing bias. This measure is also consistent with other studies such as 
Ritter (1991), Chi and Padgett (2002) amongst others.    
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The divergence of opinion hypothesis 
Miller (1977 and 2000) pointed out that the valuations of optimistic investors could be much higher 
than those of pessimistic investors if there is great deal of uncertainty about the value of an IPO. In 
particular, the long-run performance is related to the divergence of opinions and prices will adjust 
downwards as information flows increase with time and divergence of opinions decreases. However, 
the divergence of opinion will be greater the greater the ex-ante uncertainty of the IPO. As such, the 
hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between the ex-ante uncertainty and the aftermarket 
performance. Four proxies for ex-ante uncertainty are used to test this relationship. These are the age 
of the firm, the issue size, the industry of the IPO and the financial strength of the firm. Based on 
these arguments, the following hypotheses are considered. 
H1: The long run performance of IPOs is a positive function of the age of the issuing firm. 
H2: The long run performance of IPOs is a positive function of issuing size of the firm. 
H3: The long run performance of IPOs is dependent on the type of sector. 
H4:  Long-run performance is positively related to the financial strength of the IPOs. 
 
The Impresario/ Overreaction hypothesis 
Shiller (1990) develops the impresario hypothesis to predict that the IPO market is subject to fads 
and that investment bankers, acting as “impresarios”, would simply underprice because they want to 
attract investors for new issues. This result is based on the assumption that there is an information 
asymmetry between investors and issuers, and that as such, investment bankers act as intermediaries 
to certify the quality of the issue. This deliberate underpricing creates the appearance of excess 
demand to make it an event, triggering investors’ optimism and overreaction towards the stock. In 
particular, Shiller (1990) assumes that there are “fads” in the securities markets, consistent with the 
popular explanation of the overreaction hypothesis reported by De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). 
As time goes by, information is disclosed such that companies with high initial returns subsequently 
earn low returns. As such, the impresario hypothesis and the overreaction hypothesis both predict 
that the degree of underperformance of IPOs would be positively related to the degree of the 
underpricing21 and negatively related to the ex-ante financial strength of an IPO. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are formulated. 
H5: The higher the initial underpricing of an IPO, the worse is its long run performance.  
H6:  Long-run performance is negatively related to the financial strength of the IPO. 
                                                 
21
 Carter and Manaster (1990)  
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The windows of opportunity hypothesis 
A number of studies22 have justified the long-run underperformance of IPOs by arguing that 
managers take advantage of investors’ optimism. Ritter (1991, p4) claims that “If high volume 
periods are associated with poor long-run performance, this would indicate that issuers are 
successfully timing new issues to take advantage of windows of opportunity”. Ritter (1991) explains 
that issuers time their IPOs to coincide with periods where investors are willing to pay high 
multiples, which reflect their optimism regarding the growth prospects of the firms. However, the 
subsequent poor realised cash flows ultimately lead to underperformance. Loughran et al. (1994) 
suggest that if companies are successfully timing their offerings for periods when the cost of equity 
capital is relatively low, this should manifest itself in low returns subsequently being earned by 
investors. As such, IPOs are likely to be overvalued in high volume periods. Based on these 
arguments, the following hypotheses are formulated. 
H7: There is a negative relationship between the annual volume of listing and the long run 
performance of IPOs. 
H8: The long run performance of IPOs is weaker in hot markets than in cold markets. 
 
4.4 Explaining the Long run performance of IPOs 
A multivariate cross-sectional regression is used to explain the long-run performance of IPOs. The 
dependent variables consist of the buy and hold returns IPOs that went public from 1989 until 2010. 
The explanatory variables, based on the literature discussed above, include proxies for the ex-ante 
uncertainty of the firm, the impresario hypothesis and the windows of opportunity hypothesis. The 
multivariate regression employed is: 
 
        (16) 
where 36iBHAR  is the market adjusted buy and hold returns over three years after the IPOs excluding 
initial returns. Furthermore, the same regression model will be estimated using the one year and two 
year buy and hold returns. The methodologies employed to compute the independent variables used 
emanates from different studies and are summarised in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
22Loughran and Ritter (1995), Rajan and Servaes (1997), and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998). 
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5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 Long Run Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)  
This section examines the time series patterns in the aftermarket performance of IPOs on the SEM. 
Figure 1 plots the equally weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) alongside the equally 
weighted Cumulative Raw and Market Returns for the 36 months after the listing date. The three 
cumulative average returns are used in order to show the evolution and decomposition of the CAR 
series. From Figure 1, it is evident that there is a gradual decline of the long run adjusted returns over 
the three year period as the gap between cumulative raw returns and cumulative market returns 
widens. This result lends support to the widely documented hypothesis on the long run 
underperformance of IPOs. Figure 2 plots the same returns as those shown in Figure 1, but using the 
value-weighting scheme. The cumulative mean market-adjusted returns show a pattern of increasing 
and then decreasing values over time. In particular, from month 13 to month 31, the overperformance 
is observed though underperformance of IPOs persists during the first year after the initial listing. 
However, it is noticeable that the CAR series eventually shows a decline three years after listing. A 
comparison of the equally-weighted and the value-weighted CARs is shown in Figure 3. The 
underperformance seems to be lower when returns are value-weighted, suggesting that 
underperformance is more focused on small firms. 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the results for the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36-
months for the 44 Mauritian IPOs between July 1989 and December 2005. There is one company, 
Delphis Bank, which was delisted before three years such that the number of companies having the 
full 36 months of returns is 43.  Column 5 reports the CAR calculated by equal-weighting, with the 
associated t-statistics in Column 6, while Column 9 shows the CAR obtained from the value-
weighting scheme, with the t-statistic in Column 10. Table 2 shows that 26 of the 36 monthly 
average adjusted returns are negative such that there is a steady decline in the equally weighted 
cumulative average adjusted returns, which, after a slight increase in the first month of seasoning, 
falls to -16.53% by the end of month 36, exclusive of the initial return, with an associated t-statistic 
of -3.1.  Consistent with other studies23, the underperformance of the IPOs is both economically and 
statistically significant when the CAR series are equally weighted. The magnitude of 
underperformance within the range of 10 to 20% on the Mauritian market is consistent with other 
reported studies for African IPOs. In particular, Bhana (1989) and Ikoku (1998) claim a long run 
underperformance of 11.3% and 14.6% on the South-African and Nigerian markets respectively. 
                                                 
23
 Ritter (1991) for the US markets; Kooli and Suret (2002) for the Canadian markets; Zhang (2010) for the UK markets 
amongst others. 
16 
 
However, the underperformance of Mauritian IPOs is inconsistent with the findings of some Asian 
markets such as Korea, Malaysia and China,24 where overperformance has been reported.  Moreover, 
the results from the equally-weighted CAR indicate that while Mauritian IPOs may temporarily 
outperform in the first month of seasoning, on average they show a negative and significant 
abnormal performance over the three-year horizon. 
 
When the monthly abnormal returns are value-weighted by the ratio of the sample firms’ market 
capitalisations at the offer price to the total market capitalisation of the whole IPO sample, the level 
of underperformance is considerably lower than if weighted equally although the significance is 
higher. When value-weighted abnormal returns are calculated, the reported CARs are much higher, 
falling to only -4.06% by the end of month 36. These higher CAR values indicate that 
underperformance is less pronounced for larger IPO companies than smaller companies. This result 
is consistent with the study of Kooli and Suret (2004) who reported lower value weighted CAR than 
equally weighted CAR. However, the findings on the Mauritian market are inconsistent with other 
markets as Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007, p.22) claim that “large IPO companies perform less well than 
smaller IPO companies.” Overall, consistent with Ritter’s (1991) findings regarding US IPOs’ long-
term performance, in Mauritius, the aftermarket performance of firms deteriorates over the long-term 
considering both the equally-weighted and value-weighted CAR over 36 months. 
 
The different degrees of underperformance over the various investment horizons can also be 
confirmed by the comparison of the mean, median, and extreme values of the average abnormal 
returns of the IPOs. In this respect, Table 3 shows that the monthly average market adjusted returns 
range from -2.24% to 2.92% and from -2.37% to 9.60% when returns are equally weighted and value 
weighted respectively.  It is observed again that across the three different investment horizons, the 
value-weighted scheme seems to yield less underperformance than the equally-weighted method. In 
effect, the results also indicate a wide variation in the average abnormal returns among firms given 
the significant differences between the mean and median values. However, both methods show that 
underperformance of IPOs is likely to be reduced in the second year but subsequently increase in the 
third year. In particular, the three year average abnormal returns are negative irrespective of whether 
returns are equally or value weighted. In conclusion, the results seem to support the claim that IPOs 
in Mauritius will eventually exhibit significant underperformance in the long run. 
                                                 
24
 Kim et al. (1995) for the Korean Market; Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) for the Malaysian market and Chi and Padgett 
(2002) for the Chinese market. 
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5.2 Long run Performance, Buy and Hold Returns and Wealth Relatives 
According to Gompers and Lerner (2003), the CAR method is not appropriate when returns are 
volatile. On the other hand, Kooli and Suret (2004) argue that buy-and-hold abnormal returns have 
an advantage in measuring the investor experience. As such, Table 4 provides further evidence on 
the long run performance of Mauritian IPOs using buy and hold returns as well as wealth relative 
measures. This table reports the equally-weighted and value-weighted mean buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs) and wealth relatives across different holding periods for the 44 sample companies 
that went public during the period 1989 to 2005. Based on equally-weighted returns, a zero initial 
investment (i.e. taking a long position in the new issue and a short position in the index) in the new 
issues would have resulted in a loss for the investor of 0.74% by the end of 12 months, 0.53% by the 
end of 24 months and 0.72% by the end of 36 months in the post-IPO period.  However, only the two 
year and three year mean BHAR is negative and statistically significant, consistent with a number of 
studies.25    
 
As for the CARs, using the value-weighted returns, the underperformance is less noticeable. A zero 
initial investment in the new issues (again, long the new issue and short the index) would have 
resulted in an investor loss of 0.33% by the end of 12 months and 0.48% by the end of 36 months but 
a profit of 0.06% by the end of 24 months. However, the returns are all statistically insignificant. 
This result is consistent with that obtained using the value-weighted CAR measure, which produces a 
smaller fall in returns. Panel B of Table 4 shows that all the wealth relatives have a value below one 
in each of the years when returns are equally weighted, reflecting the fact that the IPO companies 
underperform the market benchmark. However, overperformance is noted over two years when 
value-weighted returns are used although ultimately the companies underperform after three years. 
Overall, the wealth relatives seem to also indicate long run underperformance of IPOs on the 
Mauritian market, consistent with the earlier BHAR values.   
 
When comparing the results obtained using the CAR and the buy-and-hold return methods, the 
underperformances obtained from BHAR analysis are smaller than those obtained from CAR 
analysis. Figure 4 and Figure 5 confirm these findings. In particular, the IPO underperformance is 
higher for 11 out of 12 holding periods for the CAR series relative to the BHAR when returns are 
equally-weighted. The result is by and large inconsistent with Barber and Lyon (1997) who argue 
                                                 
25
 Kooli and Suret (2004); Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007); Bangassa and Chen (2011), amongst others. 
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that CARs will tend to over-estimate long term performance and as such, claim that they give 
positively biased test statistics while BHAR gives negatively biased test statistics. In this respect, 
Barber and Lyon (1997) report a 5% one year CAR on average relative to a zero annual BHAR with 
respect to a given market benchmark. They argue that the CARs lead to incorrect inferences as they 
can report long-term abnormal average performance when in fact the sample of firms did not over 
perform. Similarly, the under/over performances are more pronounced for CAR series for a given 
holding period than BHAR in the long run when returns are value-weighted. These results are 
inconsistent with the arguments of Fama (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Gompers and 
Lerner (2003) who argue that the buy-and-hold return method can inflate under/over performance, 
even if it occurs in only a particular period.26  
 
5.3 Long-run Performance and Calendar Time Analysis 
Table 5 reports the results of the Fama-French (1993) three-factor time-series regressions. A 
diversified portfolio in each calendar month from July 1989 to November 2008 (233 months) is 
created. The portfolio includes firms that went public during the previous 36 months and is regressed 
on Rmt-Rft, SMB and HML.  The time-series regressions of equally-weighted and value-weighted 
IPO portfolios are estimated using OLS and weighted least squares methods. The intercepts derived 
from the three factor regressions indicate whether or not the mean monthly abnormal return on the 
calendar-time portfolio is zero. From Table 5, based on ordinary least squares, the results show that 
the alphas for the equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios are both negative. However, the 
high reported p-values indicate that the alphas are not statistically significant, and thus that the IPOs 
do not appear to exhibit significant abnormal performance on the calendar-time basis. These results 
are consistent with Ritter and Welch (2002), Gompers and Lerner (2003), and Bangassa and Chen 
(2011) amongst others, who report no significant long-run underperformance of IPOs on a calendar-
time basis.  
 
According to Gompers and Lerner (2003), using ordinary least squares will incorporate the 
assumption that the Fama-French approach weights each month equally. However, they argue that 
this will entail a reduction in any underperformance if it is correlated with the number of IPOs in the 
portfolios. As such, they suggest the use of weighted least squares regressions using the square root 
of the number of IPOs in the portfolio as weights. The results of the weighted least squares 
regressions suggest that the intercepts are negative and statistically significant for both the equally-
                                                 
26
 Similar results have been found by Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) for the Malaysian market. 
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weighted and value-weighted IPO portfolios, indicating the underperformance of Mauritian IPOs. 
This result is consistent with the predictions of Gompers and Lerner (2003), whereby 
underperformance should increase if weighted least squares methods are used. In conclusion, the 
weighted least squares regressions show that the observed significant long-run underperformance 
observed when using an event-time basis does not disappear on the calendar-time basis. 
 
5.4 The Cross Sectional Pattern of Long Run Performance 
In this section, to assess the cross-sectional variation of the long run performance, the sample is 
segmented by initial returns, offer size, market size, year of listing on the SEM, industry, hot issue 
periods, offer type and financial strength. However, it is worth mentioning that robust results may be 
hard to achieve given that the sample size is relatively small compared to a large number of studies 
in other developed and developing markets.  Given that the standard errors are inversely proportional 
to the sample size, larger standard errors are expected such that significant results may be hard to 
achieve. 
 
Long run Performance and Initial Returns 
According to DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), there is a negative relationship between past and 
subsequent abnormal returns on individual securities which can be inferred as a confirmation of 
market overreaction. To this effect, Levis (1993) claims that IPOs which generate a high initial 
premium may underperform the market in the long run. As such, if the initial excess return of IPOs is 
due to over-optimism in the market, then one might expect those IPOs to underperform in the long 
run. Thus Table 6 assesses whether there is any relationship between the initial underpricing on the 
first trading day and the long-term abnormal returns three years after listing. In particular, the results 
are categorised into different groups based on the scale of the raw initial returns. It is observed that 
the highest underperformance occurs within the highest initial return groups. IPOs which generate an 
initial underpricing of at least 40% experience greater underperformance. Given the small sample 
size, the IPOs are categorised into two groups based on the magnitude of the raw initial returns. 
Based on the median value of initial returns, the lowest 50% of the sample companies are categorised 
as the LOW initial return groups while the highest 50% of the sample companies are categorised as 
the HIGH initial return groups. The high initial return group exhibit worse long-term performance 
than those IPO companies with lower initial returns. However, the paired sample t-test shows that the 
difference in average long run performance is not significant between the groups.  Overall, the 
results are mildly supportive of the overreaction or fads hypothesis, consistent with the findings of 
Ritter (1991) and Kooli and Suret (2004).  
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Long run Performance and Offer Size 
In Table 7, the 3-year buy-and-hold returns of IPOs are segregated into different groups by the gross 
proceeds of the offers. The IPO sample is categorised into four different groups based on the 
magnitude of the gross proceeds. All gross proceeds categories display long-run underperformance 
given that the wealth relatives of all categories are less than one. However, the results suggest that 
IPOs in the highest gross proceeds category experience the least underperformance. Furthermore, the 
IPOs are categorised into two groups (small and big) based on the median offer size. The results 
show that that there is a tendency for the smaller offers to have the worst aftermarket performance, 
consistent with Ritter (1991). In particular, the mean BHAR is -0.99% for the small offer category 
while the mean BHAR is only -0.45% for the high offer category. In addition, the paired sample t-
test shows that the difference in average long run performance is significant between the two groups. 
 
According to Beatty and Ritter (1986), the size of IPOs can be used as a proxy for ex-ante 
uncertainty about the ex-post value of IPOs. Consistent with Beatty and Ritter (1986), the hypothesis 
that the ex-ante uncertainty is related positively to the underperformance is substantiated given the 
results showing that Mauritian companies with smaller offerings are likely to underperform more 
than IPOs with larger offerings in the long run. This finding is also in line with Loughran and Ritter 
(1995, p.23) who claim that “smaller offerings (frequently more speculative firms) underperform by 
more than the large firms.”27 
 
Long-run Performance and Market Size 
To ascertain whether the IPO’s long-term abnormal returns are affected by their firm size, Table 8 
segregates the IPOs into different sizes groups by market capitalisation at offer price. The results 
indicate that the underperformance is the highest (-0.91%) for those firms falling into the lowest 
market size group and is the lowest for firms which the highest market capitalization. This result is 
consistent with those obtained in the previous analysis using the value-weighted CAR measure. 
Given the small sample size, the IPOs are segregated into two groups (small and large) based on the 
median value of the market capitalizations of all firms. The results are consistent with findings of 
Zhang (2010) in the UK market where the size of firms does not significantly affect their abnormal 
returns in the long term. 
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 Keloharju (1993) also reports that for Finland, smaller IPO's perform worse than other IPOs. 
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Long-run Performance by Calendar Year 
Table 9 reports the equally-weighted mean three-year buy and hold abnormal returns for the 44 
Mauritian IPO companies, categorised by year of listing. In addition, Column 2 of Table 9 provides 
the number of IPOs taking place each year while Columns 3 and 4 report the raw buy-and-hold 
returns on the IPO companies and the SEMDEX All Share index returns for the corresponding 
cohort periods. It is evident that a poor performance of IPOs occurred across all years except for the 
year 1995 where positive abnormal returns were observed. In particular, the long run 
underperformance seems to prevail on the SEM as the wealth relatives are less than one for eleven of 
the twelve sample years.  
 
One particular characteristic of the Mauritian market is that the volume of new issues was much 
heavier in the early 1990s than in the late 1990s and early 2000s. To this effect, companies listed as 
from the early 2000s seem to experience higher average underperformance than companies listed in 
the 1990s (with the exception of the year 1992). However, the negative relationship between annual 
volume and aftermarket performance is not evident in contrast to Ritter (1991, p.19), who claims that 
“firms choose to go public when investors are willing to pay high multiples (prices-earnings or 
market-to-book) reflecting the optimistic assessments of the net present value of growth 
opportunities”. In particular, aftermarket performance has not been the lowest for the years 1989, 
1990, 1991 and 1993, although the number of annual new issues has been at least greater than six. 
On the contrary, it has also been noted that where there are few new issues, underperformance seems 
typically to be severe, though not in all cases. Overall, the relationship between annual volume and 
aftermarket performance remains inconclusive for the Mauritian IPO markets, in contrast to a 
number of studies28 on other markets where a clear negative relationship has been found. 
 
Long-run Performance and Sector 
Table 10 categorises IPO companies at the time of listing by sector groups based on the SEM seven 
sectors classification. The results show a wide variation in the long run performance of IPOs across 
the different sectors. In particular, the worst performing sector in the long term is the sugar group, 
which underperforms the SEMDEX by 1.42% over the 3-year period post-listing while companies in 
the commerce sector on average over perform the market. However, overall, the three-year 
underperformance of IPOs is present in all but one of the seven sector groupings. The Mauritian 
economy started as a mono-crop economy in the sugar sector such that stocks under this industry are 
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 Ritter (1991); Loughran and Ritter (1995); Kooli and Suret (2004) amongst others. 
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known to form part of the traditional or ‘old’ economy while the investment industry is characterised 
mainly by younger companies whose primary purpose was to constitute a fund to invest in local or 
foreign equities or other assets. When controlling for industry effects, it seems from Table 10 that 
age is not related to long run performance as both sectors seem to experience high average negative 
abnormal returns. Given the small sample size, the sectors are categorised into two groups, namely, 
financial and non-financial sectors.29 The results show that firms falling in the financial sector seem 
to experience a greater underperformance than firms in the non-financial sector. However, the mean 
test shows that the difference in underperformance is statistically insignificant. Overall, the results 
are consistent with the study of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007, p.31) on the Malaysian market who claim 
that “none of the sectors has a mean BHAR that is statistically different from the others”.   
 
Long-run Performance and Motives for going Public 
According to Rock (1986), firms enter the IPO market for two principal reasons: namely, portfolio 
diversification and as a source of funds for investment projects. In this respect, Kim et al. (1995) 
claim better long-run performance when firms consider equity financing as a last alternative for 
raising funds. To reflect the issuers’ motives for going public, the sample is divided into two 
categories by offer type. In the Mauritian context, as per the listing rules of the SEM, it is only when 
firms go public through an “offer for subscription” are the new shares issued and sold to the public 
whereas other methods of listing such as “introduction”, “offer for sale” or “placings” do not involve 
any issue of new securities. As such, from Table 11, the first group (NEW category) includes 14 
firms issuing new shares only while 30 firms in the second group (OLD category) offer old shares. 
Overall, the results show that the underperformance is marginally higher for firms issuing new shares 
than firms offering old shares. However, the difference in mean abnormal returns between the two 
categories is statistically insignificant, indicating that motives for going public do not have a 
significant impact on long run performance.30  
 
Long-run Performance and Financial Strength 
According to Ritter (1991), there is a negative relationship between ex-ante uncertainty and 
aftermarket performance. To this effect, companies with lower ex-ante financial strength are 
associated with higher ex-ante uncertainty and as such, should experience greater underperformance. 
However, based on the overreaction hypothesis, IPOs which are initially perceived to be financially 
                                                 
29
 Firms falling in the banking, insurance and investment sectors are categorised in the financial sectors while the 
remaining firms fall in the non-financial sector. 
30
 This result is similar to the Korean IPO market where Kim et al. (1995) ultimately show that the motives for going 
public have no significant impact on the long-run performance of IPOs.    
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sound should experience worse performance in the long run due to investors’ optimism. To this 
effect, in Table 12, the Mauritian IPO companies are categorised by their ex-ante financial strength 
based on their Altman Z-scores. The results indicate that firms with higher ex-ante financial strength 
on average underperform more than firms with lower financial strength and that the difference in 
mean returns between the two categories, -0.27%, is statistically significant. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the predictions of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987).    
 
5.5 Regression Analysis of Long-term Performance 
The cross-sectional patterns documented in the previous tables are not independent of each other. To 
disentangle the effects, Table 13 reports the results of a multiple regression using the three-year, two 
year and one year BHARs on IPOs as the dependent variable. Indeed, a number of theories have 
been put forward to explain the long-run performance of IPOs. As such, the variables included are 
designed to test the long-term performance of IPOs in relation to the divergence of opinion 
hypothesis, the overreaction hypothesis and the windows of opportunity hypothesis. Considering 
model 1 in Table 13, smaller offerings seem on average to experience weaker performance relative to 
firms with larger issues. This is consistent with Miller (1977) whose findings support a positive 
relationship between long-run performance and Log (proceeds) as the ex-ante uncertainty is 
inversely related to a firm’s size31. Model 1 in Table 13 also suggests that firms with higher ex-ante 
financial strength on average experience worse performance in the long-run. This finding is 
inconsistent with Ritter (1991), who claims that there should be a negative relation between the ex-
ante uncertainty and the aftermarket performance. However, the negative coefficient of the Z-score 
variable supports the view of the overreaction hypothesis whereby the ex-ante financial strength is 
associated with initial investor’s optimism which ultimately results in subsequent disappointments 
with poor long-run performance. The results also suggest that there are no significant relationships 
between the age of the firm and its long-term performance, contrary to the findings of Ritter (1991) 
and Carter et al. (1998) based on IPOs in the US. The results are consistent with Khurshed et al. 
(1999) and Zhang (2010) who find that age is not significantly related to the long-term performance 
for the UK market. In effect, Khurshed et al. (1999, p.25) claim that the “US and the UK markets 
view the importance of the age of the firm differently”. Furthermore, according to Levis (1993), 
there are marked differences in the long-run performance of individual industries. Given the small 
sample size, one industry dummy has been used to capture the difference in the long-run 
performance between firms in the finance and non-finance sector. Of the industry dummy variables 
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 This is also supported by Carter, Dark, and Singh, (1998), Sohail and Raheman (2009) who claim a negative 
relationship between underpricing and firm size. 
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used in Table 13, the estimated coefficient for the financial services and non-financial sectors is 
insignificant. This indicates that companies in the financial services industry do not perform 
consistently better than firms in the non-financial services sector post-listing (excluding the initial 
return).32 
 
According to the overreaction hypothesis, the long-run performance of IPOs should be negatively 
related to the degree of short-run underpricing. Model 2 in Table 13 shows that the coefficient for 
initial returns is negative but statistically insignificant. This implies that offerings with better first 
day performance do not necessarily have poorer long run performance. The results are inconsistent 
with a number of studies33 reported in the literature which support the view of higher initial returns 
followed by worse long-run performance. However, this result is consistent with other research such 
as that by Yu and Tse (2006) and Sohail and Raheman (2009), who also reported an insignificant 
negative relationship between aftermarket performance and the level of underpricing on the Chinese 
and Pakistani markets respectively. Based on Khurshed et al. (1999), the share price should reflect 
the business strength of a company, and with higher profitability, the company should have higher 
long-run returns. However, the estimation results from Table 13 show that the ex-ante financial 
strength of a company seems to be inversely related to its long run performance. In effect, the 
coefficient of the Z-score shows that IPOs with higher ex-ante financial strength seem on average to 
experience poorer performance, consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Based on the windows 
of opportunity hypothesis, if companies effectively go public in periods when the cost of equity 
capital is believed to be low, they would subsequently generate low returns for investors. The results 
suggest that long term performance is insignificantly different for firms going public in a low or high 
volume year.34 Similarly, the hot issue period dummy variable is statistically insignificant and as 
such, indicates that the firms going public during hot issue markets do not underperform in the long-
run. The findings are inconsistent with a number of studies35 that support the windows of opportunity 
hypothesis as a plausible explanation for the long run underperformance of IPOs. In effect, the 
results suggest that Mauritian issuers do not consider the stock market as a platform to successfully 
time their offers to lower their cost of capital. This result is consistent with the specific 
characteristics of the Mauritian equity market whereby capital raising is not the only motive for 
going public. In effect, Mauritian firms are often likely to resort to traditional sources of financing 
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 The results are inconsistent with a number of studies (Khurshed et al. (1999), Chorruk and Worthington (2009)) who 
claim a better performance for firms in the financial services industry. 
33
 Ritter (1991), Levis (1993), Khurshed et al. (1999), Omran (2005), Chi and Padgett (2002) amongst others. 
34
 Similar findings have been found by Chorruk and Worthington (2009) who claim that there is no significant negative 
relationship between issue volume (VOL) and the three-year buy-and-hold returns. 
35
 Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Kooli and Suret (2004), and Thomadakis et al. (2012) amongst others. 
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such as bank loans to finance their core activities.    
 
Model 4 in Table 13 presents the results when all explanatory variables are considered. The results 
show that the offer size and ex-ante financial strength variables are the only ones explaining the 
long-run performance of IPOs. This result is consistent with model 5 which is obtained after 
successful variable deletion tests, removing the insignificant variables. Also, the results do not 
change when the two year and one year benchmark-adjusted buy-and-hold returns are used as the 
dependent variables. Overall, the results generally support the conclusions from earlier tables, 
whereby firms with small issues and higher ex-ante financial strength seem on average to experience 
higher long run underperformance, supporting the divergence of opinion and overreaction 
hypothesis.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to measure and explain the long run performance of IPOs on the SEM. 
Based on the three year cumulative abnormal returns, the study shows that the magnitude of 
underperformance falls within the range of 10 to 20% on the Mauritian market, consistent with other 
reported studies on African IPOs but inconsistent with some Asian markets such as Korea, Malaysia 
and China, where overperformance has been reported. However, the value-weighted returns show 
that underperformance is less pronounced for larger IPO companies than smaller companies. Based 
on a multivariate regression model to explain the long run performance of IPOs, the results 
demonstrate that firms with smaller offerings and higher ex-ante financial strength seem on average 
to experience worse long run underperformance, supporting the divergence of opinion and 
overreaction hypothesis. Also, Mauritian firms do not on average time their offerings due to lower 
cost of capital and as such, there seems to be limited support for the windows of opportunity 
hypothesis.   
   
The results obtained from this study provide important information for prospective investors on the 
characteristics of Mauritian IPO markets. In particular, the study shows that new issues on the SEM 
are subject to long run underperformance, consistent with most developed and other emerging 
markets. In this respect, prospective investors should be aware that, on average, the initial capital 
gains in terms of short run underpricing will eventually be wiped out as IPOs in Mauritius will 
eventually exhibit significant underperformance in the long run. However, the study also reveals that 
the performance of some large IPO companies can be much higher than that of small IPO companies, 
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implying that investors should look for opportunities where companies are likely to make a relatively 
large offer on the market.  
 
With regards to possible future research, one could first examine the financial and operating 
performance of issuing companies before and after listing and the relationship between operating 
performance and market performance. Second, the study of the long-run performance of IPOs, could 
be extended to firms listed on the over the counter market of the SEM i.e. the Development and 
Enterprise Market. Third, it would also be helpful to assess the role of corporate governance in the 
Mauritian IPO market. In particular, the study could be extended to examine the relationship between 
the long-run performance of IPOs and the board governance quality which may be captured by board 
size, board composition and share ownership of directors. Moreover, although the number of SEOs is 
currently limited on the SEM, in the longer term research could focus on the long-run performance 
of SEOs as well as the motives behind reissuing decisions. Finally, one could undertake a study 
involving a pan-African perspective with a larger sample of IPOs to assess whether the results 
reported in this study are common to all emerging markets where investors are less sophisticated and 
liquidity is low, or whether they are unique characteristics pertaining only to Mauritian IPOs.  
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TABLE 1: COMPUTATION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY OF LONG-RUN 
PERFORMANCE 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
Study Calculation 
1iMAAR =Initial first 
day market adjusted 
return of the IPO 
Ritter (1991), Adjasi (2011) One day excess return corresponding to the issue 
by firm i, 1iR  is the one day return for firm i , and 
1mR  is the one day return for the market index 
corresponding to the offering by the firm i. 
SIZE=issue proceeds 
 
Ritter (1991), Hasan and 
Waisman (2010) 
The log of firm i’s offering size computed as the 
total number of shares issued at the offer times 
the offer price. 
AGE= Age of the firm Ritter (1991), Lowry et al. 
(2010)  
The logarithm of one plus the company’s age in 
years, where age is calculated from the year of 
incorporation to the year of listing. 
ZSCORE= Ex-ante 
financial strength 
Altman (2000) An Altman Z score is calculated based on figures 
prior to the year of listing to proxy the ex-ante 
financial strength. 
VOL= volume of IPOs Allen et al. (1999), Chorruk 
(2010) 
VOLUME is equal to Log(1+ number of IPO in 
each year) 
HOT= Dummy for hot 
issues 
Kooli and Suret  (2004) HOT takes a value one for hot issues (1989 to 
1991, 1993 and 1994) and otherwise zero for cold 
issues. 
INDUSTRY 
DUMMY36= Industry 
effects 
Ritter (1991), Allen et al. 
(1999), Kurshed et al. 
(1999), Chi and Padgett 
(2002)  
Following the principle used by Allen et al. 
(1999), where similar industries are being 
grouped together, we split the IPOs into two 
categories, the non-financial sector and the other 
sectors . This dummy variable takes a value one if 
firms are in the non-financial sector.   
 
                                                 
36
 Essentially, there are seven sectors dividing the SEM and normally, this will require six dummies to represent industry 
effects. However, because of the limited number of firms in each of those industries and the limited number of 
observations, there is the inclusion of one dummy variable to represent industry effects. The non-financial sectors 
include firms from the Sugar, Leisure and Hotels, Transport, Commerce and Industry sectors. The financial sectors 
include IPOs from Banks and Insurance and Investment.  In particular, the non-financial sectors contain firms which 
have a higher than average operating history. 
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Table 2- Cumulative Mean Abnormal Returns for Initial Public Offerings 
The Average Abnormal Returns (AR) and the Cumulative Average Returns (CAR) are computed in percent, with associated t-statistics 
for the 36 months after going public, and excluding the initial return are computed. The sample consists of 44 Mauritian IPOs from 
1989 to 2005. The average benchmark-adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t is the equally-weighted arithmetic 
average of the benchmark-adjusted returns. All returns shown in this table are monthly averages. The CAR from month 1 to month t is 
the sum of the monthly abnormal returns. CARs are equally weighted (EW) and value weighted (VW). 
 
 Equally Weighted Value Weighted 
Months of 
Seasoning 
Number of 
Firms 
AR t-Statistic CAR t-statistic AR t-statistic CAR t-statistic 
1 44 0.0292 1.7641 0.0292 2.2662 0.0047 8.3630 0.0047 8.2880 
2 44 -0.0068 -0.3847 0.0224 1.2254 -0.0237 -70.8143 -0.0190 -6.5662 
3 44 -0.0185 -2.1820 0.0039 0.1724 -0.0119 -48.2233 -0.0309 -7.6265 
4 44 -0.0189 -2.5732 -0.0150 -0.5815 -0.0176 -83.4970 -0.0485 -9.8013 
5 44 -0.0137 -1.1893 -0.0287 -0.9935 -0.0067 -24.7985 -0.0552 -9.6699 
6 44 -0.0224 -1.6309 -0.0511 -1.6145 -0.0227 -84.3749 -0.0779 -12.2150 
7 44 -0.0162 -1.9469 -0.0673 -1.9672 -0.0118 -49.5406 -0.0897 -12.8474 
8 44 0.0024 0.2060 -0.0649 -1.7750 -0.0061 -26.5791 -0.0958 -12.7062 
9 44 -0.0137 -1.4223 -0.0786 -2.0259 -0.0001 -0.4308 -0.0959 -11.9049 
10 44 0.0053 0.5482 -0.0733 -1.7916 0.0014 3.9798 -0.0945 -11.0689 
11 44 0.0160 0.8842 -0.0573 -1.3360 0.0236 21.5318 -0.0710 -7.8860 
12 44 0.0086 0.2500 -0.0487 -1.0865 0.0960 44.5425 0.0250 2.6527 
13 44 -0.0129 -1.3212 -0.0616 -1.3213 0.0082 14.7372 0.0333 3.3749 
14 44 -0.0006 -0.0664 -0.0622 -1.2846 -0.0164 -40.6039 0.0169 1.6455 
15 44 0.0104 0.9881 -0.0518 -1.0337 0.0086 26.0012 0.0255 2.3924 
16 44 0.0042 0.4017 -0.0475 -0.9187 0.0274 62.1748 0.0529 4.8020 
17 44 -0.0002 -0.0226 -0.0477 -0.8948 0.0323 66.8637 0.0852 7.4863 
18 44 -0.0069 -0.6119 -0.0546 -0.9954 0.0155 20.8386 0.1007 8.5871 
19 44 0.0032 0.3179 -0.0514 -0.9116 0.0045 17.4271 0.1052 8.7218 
20 44 -0.0054 -0.5058 -0.0568 -0.9816 0.0137 28.4277 0.1189 9.5955 
21 44 0.0096 1.1654 -0.0471 -0.7953 0.0206 61.0900 0.1396 10.9752 
22 44 -0.0003 -0.0385 -0.0474 -0.7819 0.0040 14.8622 0.1436 11.0213 
23 44 -0.0044 -0.3106 -0.0519 -0.8362 -0.0358 -86.7060 0.1078 8.0820 
24 44 -0.0110 -0.9549 -0.0628 -0.9915 0.0060 22.2327 0.1138 8.3468 
25 44 -0.0265 -1.7251 -0.0893 -1.3815 -0.0169 -74.1652 0.0970 6.9614 
26 44 -0.0135 -1.2314 -0.1029 -1.5598 -0.0211 -48.5182 0.0758 5.3349 
27 44 -0.0026 -0.2428 -0.1055 -1.5692 -0.0065 -16.2337 0.0693 4.7839 
28 44 -0.0006 -0.0582 -0.1061 -1.5504 -0.0128 -45.0127 0.0566 3.8285 
29 44 -0.0147 -1.6477 -0.1208 -1.7350 -0.0229 -50.9837 0.0336 2.2369 
30 44 0.0151 1.0359 -0.1057 -1.4751 -0.0085 -16.7535 0.0251 1.6412 
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 Equally Weighted Value Weighted 
Months of 
Seasoning 
Number of 
Firms 
AR t-Statistic CAR t-statistic AR t-statistic CAR t-statistic 
31 43 -0.0094 -1.0495 -0.1151 -1.5805 -0.0072 -30.6669 0.0179 1.1377 
32 43 -0.0287 -3.3802 -0.1438 -1.9436 -0.0348 -90.0524 -0.0169 -1.0570 
33 43 -0.0187 -1.6449 -0.1625 -2.1627 -0.0121 -28.6638 -0.0290 -1.7838 
34 43 0.0136 0.8725 -0.1490 -1.9527 0.0250 63.7545 -0.0040 -0.2426 
35 43 -0.0105 -0.8271 -0.1595 -2.0606 -0.0368 -53.9261 -0.0408 -2.4358 
36 43 -0.0058 -0.4511 -0.1653 -3.1054 0.0002 0.5943 -0.0406 -3.3887 
 
 
 
 
Table 3- Descriptive Statistics of Average Monthly Abnormal Returns 
The sample consists of 44 IPOs on the Mauritian market from 1989 to 2005.The minimum (Min), median, maximum 
(Max) and mean values of the average abnormal returns of all IPOs are presented in percentages. Also shown are the 
standard deviations of the monthly returns. The market-adjusted average monthly abnormal returns are computed for one 
year, two years and three years. The returns are equally and value weighted.   
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON LONG RUN PERFORMANCE (%)    
(N=44) MIN MAX MEAN MEDIAN STD.DEV 
One year Average Abnormal Returns      
Equally Weighted -2.24 2.92 -0.41 -1.02 1.62 
Value Weighted -2.37 9.60 0.21 -0.64 3.23 
Two year Average Abnormal Returns      
Equally Weighted -2.24 2.92 -0.26 -0.25 1.24 
Value Weighted -3.58 9.60 0.47 0.43 2.59 
Three year Average Abnormal Returns      
Equally Weighted -2.87 2.92 -0.46 -0.56 1.30 
Value Weighted -3.68 9.60 -0.11 -0.63 2.44 
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Table 4- Market-Adjusted Monthly Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) and Wealth 
Relatives (WRs) 
This table summarises the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and wealth relatives for n post-listing periods 
for 44 Mauritian IPOs over the period 1989-2005, relative to the SEMDEX. BHARs are measured from the close of the 
first day of listing until the three year anniversary of the IPO. In Panel B, wealth relatives (WR) are calculated as the ratio 
of the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of issuers to the end-of-period wealth from holding the market 
benchmarks for one, two and three post-listing periods. 
PANEL A: Mean Market-Adjusted Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs, % per month)  
Holding Period N Equally Weighted Value Weighted 
3 months 44 -0.14 -1.24 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -0.13 -1.25 
6 months 44 -1.07 -1.43** 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -1.67 -2.45 
9 months 44 -1.08 -1.19** 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -2.06 -2.40 
12 Months (1 year) 44 -0.74 -0.33 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -1.69 -0.49 
15 months 44 -0.65 -0.34 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -1.83 -0.56 
18 months 44 -0.59 0.08 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -1.95 0.24 
21 months 44 -0.49 0.23 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -1.78 0.64 
24 Months (2 Years) 44 -0.53* 0.06 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -2.31 0.26 
27 months 44 -0.66** -0.13 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -2.99 -0.44 
30 months 43 -0.62*** -0.26 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -3.20 -0.86 
33 months 43 -0.75*** -0.41 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -4.15 -1.40 
36 Months (3 Years) 43 -0.72*** -0.48 
Bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics  -4.36 -1.69 
PANEL B- Wealth Relatives (WRs)       
 N Equally Weighted Value Weighted 
WR 1 Year 44 0.9927 0.9967 
WR 2 Year 44 0.9948 1.0006 
WR 3 Year 43 0.9929 0.9953 
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Table 5- Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor Time-Series Regressions  
The sample consists of 44 IPOs over the period 1989–2005. Companies included in the IPO portfolio for each particular 
month were companies that had made an IPO during the prior three years. Rm-Rf is the value-weighted market return on 
all SEM stocks (Rm) minus the risk free rate (Rf), which is the one-month Mauritian base lending rate. SMB (small 
minus big) is the difference each month between the return on small firms and big firms. HML (high minus low) is the 
difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of 
low book-to-market stocks.  The dependent variable, which is the difference between the monthly returns on a portfolio 
of IPOs and the risk-free rate (Rp −Rf), is both equally and value weighted. The regressions are estimated using the 
ordinary least squares as well as the weighted least squares.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor Time-Series Regressions 
 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES 
 Equally Weighted Value Weighted Equally Weighted Value Weighted 
Intercept -0.0057 -0.0033 -0.0059*** -0.0053** 
P-value 0.1496 0.4851 0.0051 0.0254 
Rm-Rf 0.9418*** 0.9381*** 0.9078*** 0.8631*** 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SMB -0.1494 -0.3443 -0.0162 -0.2485*** 
P-value 0.2002 0.0153 0.7447 0.0000 
HML 0.0083 -0.0039 -0.0332 -0.0669 
P-value 0.9183 0.9678 0.5740 0.3127 
Adj. R 0.6099 0.5258 0.7512 0.7103 
F-Value 117.7543 1.943821 226.4896 184.0943 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistics 
2.0438 2.0342 2.1373 2.0973 
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Table 6- Long run Performance and Initial Returns 
This table summarises the mean stock returns of post-listing three year buy-and-hold strategies for 44 Mauritian IPO 
companies from 1989-2005, categorised by initial returns. Buy-and-hold returns are monthly averages that are equally 
weighted and measured from the close of the first day of listing until the three year anniversary of the IPO. Given the 
small sample size, firms are partitioned into two groups (low and high) based on the median value of initial returns and 
paired t-tests are conducted to examine the significance level of differences in means between those two groups. BHR, 
SEMDEX BHR and BHAR refer to the mean raw, market and abnormal buy-and-hold returns, respectively. Wealth 
relatives are defined as one plus the mean three year total return on IPO companies divided by one plus the mean three 
year total return on market benchmark. 
Distribution of Initial Raw Monthly Returns of IPOs (1989-2005) and Long run Performance 
Percentage Number 
of IPOs 
IPOs BHR (%) SEMDEX BHR (%) BHAR (%) Wealth Relative 
Initial Return Category      
0 11 0.31 1.41 -1.10 0.9892 
1-10 16 0.82 1.12 -0.30 0.9970 
10-20 9 0.30 0.85 -0.55 0.9945 
21-30 3 0.48 1.13 -0.65 0.9922 
31-40 2 0.39 0.99 -0.60 0.9873 
41-50 1 -3.50 0.37 -3.87 0.9614 
>50 2 -1.55 0.68 -2.24 0.9943 
LOW 22 0.59 1.25 -0.66 0.9935 
HIGH 22 0.04 0.82 -0.78 0.9922 
ALL(Mean) 44 0.31 1.04 -0.72 0.9929 
ALL(Median) 44 0.26 1.07 -0.81 0.9920 
Paired-Samples t-test37 0.33  
(p-values in parentheses) 0.75  
 
                                                 
37
 All series are normally distributed as per the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test such that the parametric t-test is used. 
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Table 7 Long run Performance and Gross Proceeds 
This table summarises the mean stock returns of post-listing three year buy-and-hold strategies for 44 Mauritian IPO 
companies from 1989-2005, categorised by gross proceeds. Buy-and-hold returns are monthly averages that are equally 
weighted and measured from the close of the first day of listing until the three-year anniversary of the IPO. Given the 
small sample size, firms are partitioned into two groups (small and big) based on the median value of gross proceeds and 
the paired t-tests are conducted to examine the significance level of differences in means between those two groups. 
BHR, SEMDEX BHR and BHAR refer to the mean raw, market and abnormal buy-and-hold returns, respectively. 
Wealth relatives are defined as one plus the mean three year total return on IPO companies divided by one plus the mean 
three year total return market benchmark. 
GROSS PROCEEDS AND Long run Performance 
Gross Proceeds 
Number of 
IPOs 
IPOs BHR 
(%) SEMDEX BHR (%) BHAR (%) Wealth Relative 
< Rs 0.6M 11 0.87 1.58 -0.70 0.9931 
Rs 0.61 M- Rs 7.5 M 11 -0.26 1.02 -1.28 0.9873 
Rs 7.6 M- Rs 75 M 11 0.16 0.94 -0.77 0.9923 
> Rs 75 M  11 0.49 0.61 -0.12 0.9988 
Small 22 0.30 1.30 -0.99 0.9902 
Big 22 0.32 0.77 -0.45 0.9955 
Paired-Samples t-test -5.48  
(p-values in parentheses) 0.00  
 
 
Table 8 Long run Performance and Size Effect 
This table summarises the mean stock returns of post-listing three year buy-and-hold strategies for 44 Mauritian IPO 
companies from 1989-2005, categorised by market capitalization. Buy-and-hold returns are monthly averages that are 
equally weighted and measured from the close of the first day of listing until the three year anniversary of the IPO. Given 
the small sample size, firms are partitioned into two groups (small and big) based on the median value of market 
capitalization and the paired t-tests are conducted to examine the significance level of differences in means between those 
two groups. BHR, SEMDEX BHR and BHAR refer to the mean raw, market and abnormal buy-and-hold returns, 
respectively. Wealth relatives are defined as one plus the mean three year total return on IPO companies divided by one 
plus the mean three year total return on market benchmark. 
SIZE EFFECT AND AFTER MARKET PERFORMANCE 
Market Capitalization Number 
of IPOs 
IPOs BHR (%) SEMDEX BHR (%) BHAR (%) Wealth Relative 
< Rs 125 M 11 0.28 1.19 -0.91 0.9910 
Rs 126 M-Rs 240 M 11 0.81 1.49 -0.68 0.9933 
Rs 241 M- Rs 700 M 11 -0.03 0.72 -0.74 0.9926 
> Rs 700 M 11 0.19 0.75 -0.55 0.9945 
Small 22 0.54 1.34 -0.79 0.9922 
Big 22 0.08 0.73 -0.65 0.9936 
Paired-Samples t-test -0.34  
(p-values in parentheses) 0.73  
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Table 9 Long run Performance and Calendar Year 
This table summarises the mean stock returns of post-listing three year buy-and-hold strategies for 44 Mauritian IPO 
companies from 1989-2005, categorised by the year of listing. Buy-and-hold returns are monthly averages that are 
equally weighted and measured from the close of the first day of listing until the three year anniversary of the IPO. BHR, 
SEMDEX BHR and BHAR refer to the mean raw, market and abnormal buy-and-hold returns, respectively. Wealth 
relatives are defined as one plus the mean three year total return on IPO companies divided by one plus the mean three 
year total return on market benchmark. 
AFTERMARKET PERFORMANCE AND THE YEAR OF ISSUANCE 
Year Number of 
IPOs IPOs BHR (%) SEMDEX BHR (%) BHAR (%) Wealth Relative 
1989 6 0.57 1.11 -0.54 0.9946 
1990 7 0.55 1.34 -0.79 0.9922 
1991 6 2.27 2.45 -0.18 0.9982 
1992 2 -1.49 1.54 -3.03 0.9702 
1993 8 0.07 0.69 -0.63 0.9938 
1994 5 -1.27 -0.31 -0.96 0.9903 
1995 3 1.15 0.39 0.76 1.0076 
1996 3 -0.33 0.55 -0.89 0.9912 
1997 - - - - - 
1998 - - - - - 
1999 1 -1.46 -0.56 -0.90 0.9910 
2000 - - - - - 
2001 - - - - - 
2002 1 0.59 1.92 -1.32 0.9870 
2003 - - - - - 
2004 1 0.46 2.18 -1.72 0.9831 
2005 1 -0.32 1.34 -1.66 0.9836 
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Table 10 Long run Performance and Sector 
This table summarises the mean stock returns of post-listing three year buy-and-hold strategies for 44 IPO companies 
categorised by sector. Buy-and-hold returns are equally weighted and measured from the close of the first day of listing 
until the three year anniversary of the IPO. BHR, SEMDEX BHR and BHAR refer to the mean monthly raw, market and 
abnormal buy-and-hold returns, respectively. Age is the difference between the listing year and the year of incorporation. 
Wealth relatives are defined as one plus the mean three year total return on IPO companies divided by one plus the mean 
three year total return on market benchmark. 
AFTERMARKET PERFORMANCE AND INDUSTRY 
SECTORS Number of 
IPOs 
 
Mean 
Age 
(Years) 
IPOs 
BHR 
(%) 
SEMDEX 
BHR (%) 
BHAR (%) Wealth Relative 
BANKS AND INSURANCE 8 23.25 0.47 0.86 -0.39 0.9961 
COMMERCE 7 21.14 1.52 1.50 0.02 1.0002 
HOTELS AND LEISURE 5 15.40 0.35 0.80 -0.45 0.9955 
INDUSTRY 7 27.71 -0.27 0.72 -1.00 0.9901 
INVESTMENT 11 11.91 -0.04 1.09 -1.13 0.9888 
SUGAR 5 65.20 0.10 1.52 -1.42 0.9860 
TRANSPORT 1 28.00 -0.43 -0.40 -0.03 0.9997 
Financial Sector 19 17.58 0.17 0.99 -0.82 0.9919 
Non-Financial Sector 25 31.49 0.42 1.07 -0.65 0.9936 
Paired-Samples t-test   -1.01  
(p-values in parentheses)   0.33  
 
 
Table 11 Long run Performance and Motives for going Public 
This table summarises the mean stock returns of post-listing three year buy-and-hold strategies for 44 Mauritian IPOs 
categorised by type of offer.  Considering the types of offer, the NEW category stands for all firms which have issued 
new shares in the IPO market while the OLD category represents instances where no new shares are created.  Buy-and-
hold returns are equally weighted and measured from the close of the first day of listing until the three year anniversary 
of the IPO. BHR, SEMDEX BHR and BHAR refer to the mean monthly raw, market and abnormal buy-and-hold 
returns, respectively. 
Long run performance and Types of Offer  
Types of Offer Number of IPOs IPOs BHR (%) SEMDEX BHR 
(%) 
BHAR 
(%) 
Wealth Relative 
New 14 -0.04 0.75 -0.79 0.9922 
Old 30 0.48 1.17 -0.69 0.9932 
Paired-Samples t-test   0.16  
(p-values in parentheses)   0.87  
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Table 12 Long run Performance and Financial Strength 
This table summarises the mean monthly stock returns of post-listing three year buy-and-hold strategies for 44 Mauritian 
IPO companies from 1989-2005, categorised by their ex-ante financial strengths proxied by the ALTMAN Z-score 
model. Based on Altman (2000), those firms having of a score less than 1.23 will be considered in low financial health 
groups. 
Long run performance and Types of Offer  
FINANCIAL 
STRENGTH 
Number of 
IPOs 
IPOs BHR (%) SEMDEX BHR (%) BHAR (%) Wealth 
Relative 
HIGH 26 -0.03 0.92 -0.95 0.9906 
LOW 18 0.44 1.12 -0.68 0.9933 
Paired-Sample t-test   -4.26  
(p-values in parentheses)   0.00  
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Table 13 Multiple Regression to Explain the Long Run Performance of IPOs 
The sample period takes into account 44 IPOs from 1989 until 2005. The dependent variable is the three year, two year 
and one year buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of companies where as the independent variables are defined as 
follows: MIR= Initial first day market adjusted return of the IPO, SIZE= log of issue proceeds, AGE= the logarithm of 
one plus the company’s age in years, where age is calculated from the year of incorporation to the year of listing, 
ZSCORE= Ex-ante Financial Strength,VOL= Log(1+ number of IPO in each year), HOT=dummy variable takes a value 
one if firms are in the hot markets and zero if cold markets and INDUSTRY= dummy variable takes a value one if firms 
are in the non-financial sector and zero otherwise. Conventional p-values are reported below each estimate. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Dependent 
Variable 
3 YEAR BHARs 2 YEAR BHARs 1 YEAR BHARs 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Variables The 
divergence of 
opinion 
hypothesis 
The Over-
reaction 
hypothesis 
The 
windows of 
opportunity 
hypothesis 
All 
Variables 
Final Model All Variables Final Model All 
Variables 
Final 
Model 
Intercept -0.0087 
-0.0049** -0.0249** -0.0191* -0.0120*** -0.0042 -0.0050** -0.0140 -0.0085** 
P-Value 0.2209 0.0269 0.0222 0.0961 0.0000 0.7842 0.0498 0.6593 0.0445 
MIR   -0.0064   -0.0107   -0.0153   -0.0069   
P-Value   0.4239   0.2061   0.1131   0.6934   
SIZE 0.0004***     0.0004** 0.0005*** 2.57E-11*** 1.93E-11*** 5.18E-11*** 4.21E-11** 
P-Value 0.0084     0.0134 0.0042 0.0036 0.0066 0.0111 0.0421 
AGE -0.0019     -0.0039   -0.0050   -0.0008   
P-Value 0.6287     0.3804   0.3874   0.9578   
ZSCORE -0.0004*** -0.0004**   -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0006** -0.0005*** -0.0006** -0.0007*** 
P-Value 0.0010 0.0234   0.0009 0.0001 0.0123 0.0028 0.0755 0.0009 
VOL     0.0309 0.0262   0.0098   0.0125   
P-Value     0.1409 0.1685   0.6773   0.7240   
HOT     -0.0083 -0.0070   0.0027   0.0019   
P-Value     0.3640 0.4957   0.8190   0.9107   
INDUSTRY -0.0016     -0.0011   -0.0063   -0.0116   
P-Value 
0.6963   
  
0.7720 
  
0.2189 
  
0.2709 
 
  
Adjusted R2 0.0853 0.0827 0.0268 0.1014 0.1236 0.1613 0.1590 0.1010 0.1442 
F-VALUE 2.0024 2.9378 1.5931 1.6935 4.0329 2.1810 5.0662 1.6902 4.6236 
Prob.(F) 0.1132 0.0642 0.2156 0.1418 0.0252 0.0594 0.0108 0.1426 0.0155 
White Test- 
(P-value) 0.7475 0.1803 0.3958 0.1589 0.4567 0.4460 0.906569 0.3174 0.9540 
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Figure 1- Cumulative Abnormal Returns- Equally Weighted 
The sample consists of 44 IPOs by firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius from July 1989 to 2005. The 
aftermarket performance is measured by equally weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) which are plotted 
alongside the equally weighted Cumulative Raw and Market Returns for the 36 months after the listing date.  
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Figure 2- Cumulative Abnormal Returns- Value Weighted 
The sample consists of 44 IPOs by firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius from July 1989 to 2005. The 
aftermarket performance measured by the value weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) which is plotted 
alongside the value weighted Cumulative Raw and Market Returns for the 36 months after the listing date.  
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Figure 3- Cumulative Abnormal Returns- Equally and Value Weighted 
The sample consists of 44 IPOs by firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius from July 1989 to 2005. The 
aftermarket performance is measured by equally weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and the value weighted 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) which is plotted for the 36 months after the listing date.  
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Figure 4- Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (Equally 
Weighted) 
The sample consists of 44 IPOs by firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius from July 1989 to 2005. The 
aftermarket performance is measured using equally weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and the equally 
weighted Buy and Hold Market Adjusted Returns (BHARs). Both the CARs and BHARs series are plotted for the 36 
months after the listing date.  
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Figure 5- Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (Value 
Weighted) 
The sample consists of 44 IPOs by firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius from July 1989 to 2005. The 
aftermarket performance is measured using value weighted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and the value 
weighted Buy and Hold Market Adjusted Returns (BHARs). Both the CARs and BHARs series are plotted for the 36 
months after the listing date. 
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